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The Politics of Protection: Interpreting
Commercial Policy in Late Bourbon and
Early National Mexico
R ICHARD J. S ALVUCC I , LINDA K. S ALVUCC I ,
AND ASLAN COHEN

The breadth, depth, and persistence of political instability in independent
M exico have long been the object of historians' attention. "Mexico," writes
one, "experimented with monarchy, moderate constitutional republic, radical
populist regime, conservative government, and liberal government; each in
turn failed to produce stability."r From 1824 through 1853, Mexico experienced the "institutionalized disorder" of "manifold pronunciamientos . . .
endless cabinet changes, and several lurches to the political left or right." 2
Repeatedly invaded, blockaded, partitioned, and plunged into civil war
between 1835 and 1867, Mexico was for most of its early history more a
geographical expression than a political one. "The present state of anarchy
[has] lasted for a quarter of a century," edirorialized The &onomist in 1861.
"There is no power in Mexico.... It is not a nation. It is not a state. It is not
a government at all." 3 This was not an isolated opinion.
Endless turmoil-the absence of an effective, legitimate, and enduring
center of power--gives rise to no end of explanations. Lucas Alaman (17921853)-historian, statesman, political economist, and above all no liberalblamed skepticism, the Enlightenment, and the collapse of the Spanish Empire
for Mexico's difficulties. The fall of the Bourbon monarchy in 1808 revealed
deep divisions whose legacy Mexico had never quite overcome. Catholicism
and colonialism were the elements that had bound the nation, but they did so
no longer. 4 In a different vein, Thomas Jefferson spoke for republicans who
found Spanish America's "regal Catholicism" abhorrent. By 1817 Jefferson
was predicting a future of Bonapartes, if not Bonapartism, for the insurgent
colonies. 5 And, indeed, by the Mexican War (if not before), most observers
in the United States thought that Mexico was hopelessly corrupt, ill-governed, and deficient in republican civic consciousness: a priest-ridden
nation to which progress came slowly, if at a ll. 6

95

SALVUCCI, SALVUCCI, AND COHEN

Economic explanations of Mexican instability focus on the trade cycle.
In the long run, the volume and value of trade linked public finance to the
tariff. The ebb and flow of trade made recurrent revenue crises inevitable,
and shortfalls were "militarized" by the large share of the military in
national spending. As Anthony Butler, the American charge d'affaires in
Mexico in 1830, put it, "The praetorian bands of Mexico, like those of
ancient Rome, must have money and indulgences, and those who promise
fairest secure their aid, until one promise fails or a better one is made." 7
Yet the story was rather more complex. Mexico now confronted something
other than a world of recurring, but essentially predictable, trade cycles. For
the independence of Mexico coincided with a profound change in the
dimensions and pattern of international trade. 8 By the 1830s, the volume and
value of this trade were expanding rapidly, and the terms of trade-the relative
prices of exportS and imports-were in a state of flux as well. 9
Moreover, nations such as Mexico and Peru were more than passive
bystanders in the international arena. Each reacted to the changing circumstances of international trade in ways that reflected their own domestic
political interests and economic endowments. In this context, the shaping
of commercial policy-the making of the tariff-was a critical and widespread concern of early national political economy in Spanish America.
There were perfectly logical reasons for this pervasive concern. Only trade
restrictions in some form could "moderate" the disruptive effects of the
new trade in wage goods, such as inexpensive cottons. Trade adjustment
in early national Spanish America was a prolonged, painful, and costly
process. As patterns of comparative advantage shifted, protection offered
relief, if not salvation, to producers whose very existence was threatened.
In independent Mexico, then, political economy was essentially the political economy of the tariff. The economics of the tariff was the economics
that really mattered. Hence the focus of this essay. 10

History and Theory
The story begins with the commercial history of the Spanish Empire
under the Hapsburgs and the Bourbons. Io broad outline, the tale is well
11
known. Here we need only repeat that trade between the Indies and Spain
was in theory governed by a detailed and closely regulated regime. For
fiscal and military reasons, formal access to the trade was restricted to
licensed groups of merchants in Mexico City, Lima, Seville, and, later,
Cadiz. Of course, the reality was far different. English, French, Dutch, and
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Portuguese smugglers had made significant inroads into legal trade by the
late seventeenth century, and crises, such as the War of Spanish Succession
12
(1700-1713), were marked by pervasive contraband.
Nevertheless, it was not until the eighteenth century that formal, systematic changes in the trading system were undertaken. Until the 1780s,
consumer demand in the Indies (with the exception of small, peripheral
economies such as Chile, Venezuela, and to a lesser degree Peru) was far
from integrated into the international economy. H istorically, Spanish fleets
carried textiles that cost far too much to be consumed by any but a small
segment of the colonial elite. In Mexico perhaps one in six people could
afford imported textiles at the end of the eighteenth century, and some
contemporaries judged the market even smaller. 1 3
Yet by the middle of the eighteenth century, significant changes in this
well-established regime were clearly visible. Because of the growth of
mining, Mexico's capacity to import expanded, and its demand for imports
increased. Contraband grew to perhaps half of all international trade, and
the colony's older artisan textile industry was placed at risk. 14
In other words, the extension of "free trade" to Mexico after 1789
revealed the nature of its comparative advantage. With the advent of
this looser system, the famous if misnamed comercio Libre, Mexico
received larger quantities of European (and English) textiles than before. As the supply of shipping to the Indies grew, the cost of transportation fell (abetted by technological improvements), and cheaper goods,
such as English cottons, could be imported. The new system may not
have been revolutionary, but the traditional import-export merchants,
who hated competition, protested vigorously. 15 By the l 8 l os some of
them alleged that the old woolen manufactories of Queretaro, Mexico
City, and Guadalajara-holdovers from an age when the colony of
necessity produced much of its own textiles-faced a cost disadvantage
of as much as 50 percent in dealing with imported British cottons. The
artisan communities of Mexico City, where thousands went unemployed, and those in Puebla, Queretaro, Oaxaca, and San Miguel
demanded protection from imports. These complaints continued well
into the 1820s and 1830s. r 6
In the century after l 7 5o, in short, the Mexican economy entered a new
international environment. The growing productivity of British textile
manufacturing and shipping led to a sharp fall in import prices, particularly
after the transient inflation of the Napoleonic Wars (1793-1815) had
passed. The volume of international trade then expanded dramatically after
181 5, and the terms of trade slowly improved. 17
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Still, old patterns of production in Mexico died hard, and painful
adjustments were necessary. The manufacture of colonial woolens, for
example, was nearly as old as the Spanish presence in Mexico and supplied
everyday fabrics for a variety of uses. It could not withstand the "new
international order" of the nineteenth century. By the late 1810s, the price
of imports into Mexico had fallen sharply. By the 1820s, it was reportedly
a half or a third of what it had been under the old Hapsburg fleet system. 18
Nevertheless, as David Brading pointed out nearly two decades ago, the
impact of comercio libre was by no means uniform. As new merchants in
Veracruz, for example, competed away the profits of a formerly restricted
trade, alternative investments became more attractive. Indeed, Brading
ascribes the late colonial mining boom in part to a flow of resources from
other sectors of the economy. 19 In this he was undoubtedly correct, as the
following example suggests.
Consider the case of textiles. A fall in the international price of textiles
implied a rise in the price of Mexican silver in terms of textiles-change
in relative prices, in other words. 20 A given quantity of Mexican silver
could now purchase more cloth. The profitability of mining would rise,
and in relation to it the profitability of domestic textile production would
fall. If possible, and over time, Mexican investors would shift from
manufacturing textiles to mining more silver; if possible, labor would move
as well. As a result, the patterns of trade and domestic production would
change. Mexico would manufacture fewer textiles and mine more silver in
order to import cloth. And in fact this is more or less what happened. 21
This example suggests the possibilities inherent in a systematic analysis
of responses to commercial change in early nineteenth-century Mexico.
And indeed, models of trade adjustment provide one avenue of study. They
explain the shape and substance of commercial policy in an economy
confronted by profound changes in the international arena. But just as
important, they illustrate Mexico's ability-or inability-to adapt to
changes that coincided with the early years of independence. In so doing,
they shed more than a little light on the dynamics of the economic crisis
that confronted Mexico after separation from Spain.

A Specific-Factors Model of Trade
Let us examine a simple model of the Mexican economy at the end of
the colonial period, a so-called specific-factors or short-run model. u It
assumes that the economy has only two sectors, textiles (T) and mining
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(M), and that only capital (K) and labor (L) are employed in producing
cloth or silver. The level of capital is specific to each industry. That is,
specific machines can be used only for a specific purpose. Looms have no
use in mining, nor picks and shovels in weaving. On the other hand, labor
is mobile and can move between textiles and mining. Supplies of labor and
capital are assumed to be stable and fully employed. Finally, the economy
is a small one; its actions have no effect on the world price of silver or
cloth. Of course, it is possible to relax or change the assumptions of the
model and obtain different results.
But even modeling Mexico as a small economy whose actions can not
affect the price of cloth or silver is not unrealistic. At the peak of the
Mexican silver bonanza of the late eighteenth century, the price of silver
on the London market fell by less than 4 percent, even as production rose
by more than 50 percent. :1.3 In other words, an elastic demand for specie
and bullion worldwide boosted real revenues from silver production in
Mexico almost as rapidly as silver could be mined. Small wonder that many
Mexicans believed the road to wealth was paved with silver.
This model has several implications. Given its assumptions, Mexican
(domestic) prices are given by
Pr= Pr • (I + Zr)
Pm = Pm• (I + Zm)
where Pr and Pm are the domestic prices of textiles (T) and silver (M)
respectively; an asterisk denotes foreign prices, which are assumed to be
given to the country; and z is the import tax rate levied on any of the
commodities. Consequently, even if the country is small and cannot affect
world prices, a change in the import tax rate will have a direct effect on
the level of domestic prices.
Consider what occurs when the relative price of Mexican silver (M)
increases. (This, we recall, is what happened as English industrialization,
changes in the supply and productivity of shipping, and modifications in
Spanish commercial policy combined to drive down the world price of
textiles [f] even as the price of Mexican silver remained stable.) Producing
silver rather than textiles becomes more attractive to Mexicans, since the
purchasing power of a unit of silver increases. As a result, resources should
flow from domestic textile production to silver mining. But, by assumption,
capital is fixed in each sector so that labor alone can move. As a result,
capital in mining becomes more productive. If payments to labor and
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capital reflect their relative productivity, the owners of mining capital
will receive a higher return. Indeed, the rental rare of mining capital
will increase by a larger margin than any of the prices of final goods
(that is, textiles and silver). By the same token, the productivity of
capital in domestic textiles would fall, and its owners would receive a
lower return.
What happens to labor? As workers move toward mining, their productivity in mining must fall, thus reducing the real wage. 24 However, and for
similar reasons, the productivity of the remaining textile workers must rise,
as does their real wage. Since, by assumption, labor is free ro move between
sectors, wage rares must ultimately equalize, and labor will migrate until
that result is achieved. But it is impossible to say whether or not the overall
real wage has risen or fallen. This depends on rhe basket of goods consumed
by labor and, in particular, on the proportion of their income (1t) given
over to textiles. The real wage will increase only if the percentage increase
in the money wage exceeds the increase in {1tPt + (1 - rt) Pm}.
·
If we let d denote percentage change, R the rate of payment to owners
of capital, and W the wage rate, the results can be summarized in the
following simple expression:

C1Rm > oPm >

oW > <1Pt > C1Rt

The inequalities would, of course, be reversed i( the original (exogenous)
increase had been in the relative price of textiles.
In simple terms, the results mean that the beneficiaries of the rising
relative price of silver (or falling relative price of textiles) are the owners
of mining capital. The owners of capital in textiles are the clear losers.
The position of the workers is indeterminate and lies somewhere
between mining and textiles. As a consequence, it is easy to see rhar rhe
owners of capital will favor prorecrion (an increase in rhe rare of rhe
import tax) of the goods in their own industry and will oppose protection of the other. The workers' position on questions of trade protection
is necessarily ambiguous, bur some tentative observations may be made.

Back to the Past
The historian's road to heaven is paved with evidence. As G. K. Chesterton once remarked, to enter the world of facts is to enter a world of
limits. Did Mexicans behave in ways that accord more or less with the
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predictions of the model? If not, then why not? And what can we say about
agriculture, a sector that has gone unmentioned until now?
We have already mentioned the complaints of the great import-export
merchants about the extension of comercio libre in 1789. As Brading
suggests, the new system altered their investment incentives and channeled
more capital into silver mining. :z.5 Yet merchant capital had also migrated
into woolen production in Quereraro and Acambaro. :z.6 By definition, this
investment became less attractive, hastening the reallocation that Brading
observed. There were also merchants and merchant houses that owned
textile manufactories, of which the firm of Vertiz and Oteyza in Mexico
City was the most important. :z.7 Nevertheless, there were few other instances of direct ownership. The network of merchants who distributed
domestic cloth, financed its production, and supplied raw materials was
more important than the ownership of the manufactories themselves.
These merchants handled cottons and woolens and could be found in
Mexico City, Puebla, Guadalajara, Tlaxcala, San Miguel el Grande, Oaxaca, and indeed throughout the colony. :z.S Consequently, important segments of the colonial merchant community opposed free trade. Merchants
who had gotten rich under the old fleet system hated comercio libre. Those
who furnished and financed colonial textile production were no more
sympathetic. In Guadalajara, for instance, where commercial capital had
underwritten cotton production, the merchant guild argued that imports
from Manila would ruin local industry. :z.9 On the basis of naked self-interest, only the parvenu merchants of Veracruz, tied to foreign suppliers and
schooled in the virtues of expansive demand, generally leaned toward
free-trade liberalism.3° And even they regarded "free" trade as their
exclusive preserve. The participation of Havana merchants in the trade,
for instance, was not welcome. 31
If merchants who supplied, produced, and marketed domestic textiles
were opposed to freer trade, the position of urban artisans and industrialists
was similar. As far as artisans were concerned, there was a sensible
economic rationale for their belief. Many urban artisans owned the looms
they used, in effect tying their capital to the textile industry. As a result, it
was difficult for them to move to other activities; this made trade protection
an attractive, even vital, policy.3:z.
A vigorous defense of the artisans' position was written in I8I I by Juan
L6pez Cancelada, a Spaniard for whom mercantilist principles were less
pressing than imperialist xenophobia. 33 He warned his Mexican compatriots against trading with foreigners: "The cloth and serges of Queretaro,
Acambaro, Cholula, Aguascalientes, La Quemada, Potosi and other places
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are what men and women wear.... I don't know if you could think of a worse
fate than taking their money and making them wear foreign fashions ....
Mexicans are capable of making anything made anywhere else in the world"
{italics in original). 34 The merchant guild of Mexico City went further. Writing
in the wake of the Hidalgo rebellion, the merchants sounded an old theme:
"If direct trade with foreigners destroys our industry and factories, and reduces
thousands of workers in both Americas to poverty, who can deny that this
trade will extinguish the fire of patriotism and loyalty that still exists in their
hearts?"35 Defenders of restricted trade had long argued that commercial
liberalism and Spanish hegemony were mutually exclusive. As it happens, they
may have been right.36
Independence from Spain changed the context and possibilities of the
debate, but not its substance. Both the Junta Nacional Instituyente (1823)
and the Congreso Constituyente (1823-24) witnessed heated clashes over
commercial policy. In both, spokesmen for artisan and industrial interests
demanded outright prohibition of certain cottons or substantially increased
levels of protection. And in both forums, their opponents argued that
protection distorted incentives and risked alienating Great Britain, which
had yet to formally recognize independent Mexico. Most important, the
latter said, protection taxed the mass of consumers for the benefit of a
smaller number of artisan textile producers. Some opponents of protection virtually asserted this: "Our confederation is not composed of
manufacturers, but of landowners, farmers, and miners, the true basis of
our wealth. " 37 In other words, everyone understood that commercial
policy affected the distribution of wealth. As the tariff commission of 18 24
wrote, "The great conflict [we] face has been to reconcile the interests of
producers of raw materials and [those] of artisans with the least prejudice
to the consumer." 38
The statistics available indicate that these pressures did not go unheeded,
at least from the standpoint of artisans and industrialists. One very crude
way of judging the strength of pressures for protection is by computing the
implicit tariff index, or the ratio of "external" taxes {taxes on trade) to the
current value of imports. This procedure, of course, does not produce a
wholly satisfactory index of protection. As Robert Lipsey observes, "The
level of the tariff rate on a commodity influences the weight of the
commodity in the index. A sufficiently high tariff could conceivably remove
itself from the index by eliminating the import."3 9 Indeed, the Tariff of
18 37 legislated the outright prohibition of most inexpensive cottons. As a
result, the statistics that appear in table r, especially in the 1 84os, are
conservative measures of the level of protection.
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Table r Implicit Index of Tariff Protection: Trade Taxes as a
Percentage of Current Peso Import Values
Year

Percentage

1821
1825
1825-26
1826-27
1827-28
1840
1841
1842
1843
1844
1845

25
32
46
47
30
36
42
44
55
56
35

Sources and Computation: 1821 assumed as a maximum from the ad valorem
rate. Trade tax figures from Estadisticas hist6ricas de Mexico, 2:629, cuadro 18. 3. Peso
imports from 1840 through 1845 estimated as the sum of France, United States, and
Great Britain, drawn from Ines Herrera Canales, El comercio exterior de Mexico
(Mexico, 1977), 82. Trade taxes include relatively small figures for export duties. See
Miguel Lerdo de Tejada, Comercio exterior de Mexico (1853; Mexico, 1967), Table
4 3. There are discrepancies between the totals reported by Lerdo de Tejada and by the

Estadfsticas hist6ricas, which draw on data supplied by Matias Romero.

At no time in the mid to late I 8 20s did the ratio of external taxes to the
current value of imports fall to anything approaching its low level in 1821,
and by the early 1840s, it was nearly twice as high. In its movements, the
statistic confirms what historians now know. After an early flirtation with
low tariffs, Mexican politicians opted for significantly higher levels of
protection. We have thus far suggested why there was significant protectionist pressure, but we have not explained why there was significant tariff
protection. To make sense of what happened, we need to return to the
model, to consider the role of agriculture, and to assess the relative strength
of groups that could benefit from commercial liberalization.
From the standpoint of the model, miners were most favored by low
taxes on trade. But there were not that many miners or mine owners.
Brading gives a rough estimate of "three thousand odd mines found in New
Spain by the last decades of the colonial period. "40 Even considering the
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complex connections among suppliers, financiers, investors, merchants,
silver bankers, and mine owners, it is hard to imagine that more than
l 50,000 persons (3,000 mines x 50 per mine) had a direct claim on mining
profits, and that figure may be exaggerated in view of the tendency toward
concentration in ownership and supply. Moreover, the abortive revolution
that shook the colony in the l 8 l os wrecked parts of the industry, especially
in the Bajio. Silver coined at the Mexico City mint fell from a yearly average
of 21.5 million pesos (1800-1809) to 8.9 million (1810-19), while the
price of silver on the London market during the 1810s jumped 10 percent.41 Clearly shaken by the conflict, the cadre of silver miners that had
constituted one of the backbones of Bourbon society existed in diminished
form in the 1820s and exercised less influence. Its only clear objective was,
perhaps, to maintain the unrestricted export of specie and bullion, a
position justified by the Hume specie-flow mechanism of trade adjustment. 42

Phantom Farmers
It is useful to look at the situation in agriculture in concrete historical terms.
After all, there were some who saw Mexico as the potential granary for a
Spanish Caribbean basin whose specialization in sugar, tobacco, and coffee
was rapidly emerging. The famous secretary of the consulado of Veracruz,
Jose Maria Quiros, said just this in l 808: "In times of peace, the island of Cuba
can be completely supplied with necessary foodstuffs by this Kingdom [Mexico] and by the other Spanish colonies. Its ports should be closed to foreigners. "43 Yet in 1793 Revillagigedo the Younger, New Spain's brilliant viceroy,
had predicted that "wheat flour from this kingdom, the most important branch
of the export trade, will never be able to compete with that from the United
States."44 In this case, an argument to authority settles nothing. Both men
knew the colony well, although Quiros was not above stretching the truth to
bring Veracruz a little business or investment.
In fact, the historical evidence favors Revillagigedo. Even conservative
calculations suggest that it would have been necessary to divert at least the
entire supply of Mexico City's wheat flour to feed the city of Havana alone,
and this by estimating Havana's needs most modestly. Mexico could not
possibly have served as a granary for Cuba, let alone the entire Caribbean,
whatever its own production may have been. 45 Yet this same evidence implies
that there was a potentially large Caribbean market for agricultural exports in
the early nineteenth century. Why were Mexicans unable to tap it?
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In the late 1770s, wheat flour exports through Veracruz averaged
roughly 20,000 tercios per year, or some l 8,ooo North American barrels.
The merchant guild of Veracruz estimated in 1809 that public and private
shipments of flour to Havana regularly reached 30,000 tercios, or 26,700
barrels. But Mexican shipments were trivial in comparison with North
American ones. Even small Mexican exports varied inversely with North
American shipments, as the negative correlation (-.45) between the two
series in table 2 suggests. As North Americans sent more, the market for
Mexican flour shrank. Mexico simply could not compete with the breadbasket of the middle states.
To illustrate this further, let us examine one analysis of the situation in
46
l 808 by the Cuban political economist Francisco de Arango.
According
to Arango, the purchase price in Puebla of roo tercios (17,500 pounds or
89 barrels) of flour was 700 pesos. To ship the flour to the Gulf Coast of
Mexico a substantial 400 pesos. Once in Veracruz, the cargo was liable for
three separate municipal taxes, as well as for dockage and brokerage fees.
Combined, these added another 126 pesos to the 1,100 already spent on
purchase and transportation. It cost another 200 pesos to ship the flour,

Table 2. Mexican Wheat Flour Exports to Spanish America Versus
U.S. Wheat Flour Exports to the Spanish West Indies, 1802- 12
Year

United States
(Barrels)

Mexico (Tercios)
Converted to U.S. Barrels

1802
1803
1804
1805
1806
1807
1808
1809
1810
181I
1812

70,238
36,314
93,071
131,026
113,178
166,170
44,778
143,857
138,892
12 4,735
II9,440

20,343
17,351
23,470
2,642
2,375
4,960
18,755
23,784
14,269
8,634
1,387

Sources: Mexican exports are drawn from Lerdo de Tejada, Comercio exterior,
throughout and converted to U.S. barrels by multiplying by .89; U.S. exports from
Linda K. Salvucci, "Development and Decline: The Port of Philadelphia and
Spanish Imperial Markets, 1783-1823'' (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1985),
p. 136.
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presumably uninsured, from Veracruz to Havana. At this last destination,
there were three more local levies plus brokerage and commission fees, as
well as charges for delivery to the warehouse. In sum, the outlay after
leaving Veracruz fixed another 384 pesos to the total. The overall figure
for Mexican flour delivered to Havana thus came to 1 ,610 pesos, or about
1 6 pesos per tercio.
By contrast, 100 barrels of Philadelphia flour cost at most 6 50 pesos and
weighed 2,100 pounds more than 100 tercios, so that tercio-barrel comparisons are somewhat biased against the North American measure. Once
purchased, the Philadelphia flour was subject to 62 pesos in costs for
cooperage, commissions, and insurance at 2.. 5 percent. To transport the
American cargo to Havana cost 200 pesos, or exactly the same as to carry
flour from Veracruz to the Cuban port. Upon arriving in Havana, the
Philadelphia barrels paid municipal taxes, as well as brokerage, commission, and delivery fees; these came to about 1 5 pesos more than those paid
by Mexican grain. Still, total expenditure on flour from Philadelphia
amounted to 1, 12.1 pesos, or 11 pesos per barrel. A barrel of Philadelphia
flour delivered to Havana thus cost 5 pesos less than a Mexican tercio, even
though it weighed 21 pounds more and was generally regarded as far
superior in quality to the Mexican product.
If we look at these figures from a different perspective, the significance
of transportation costs emerges. Assume, for the moment, that Mexican
and Pennsylvania flour were available at equal cost, and that neither was
subject to any charge other than transportation. In that case, the difference
in cost between a Mexican and a Philadelphian shipment was 450 pesos
((700 + 4 00 + 200) - (650 + 250)], or somewhat more than the cost (400
pesos) of transporting flour from Puebla to Veracruz. Under conditions of
competitive free trade, then, these figures indicate that Mexican flour could
not compete with flour from Pennsylvania even if the cost of transportation
were subsidized by the Spanish crown or extracted involuntarily from
Cuban planters. Of course, by taxing the Mexican flour both in Veracruz
and in Havana, Spanish policymakers only made a difficult situation
impossible. Mexico had no comparative advantage in agriculture.
There are some interesting implications. Had Spain not lost Mexico in
1821, Mexico could have sold agricultural surpluses to Cuba and Puerto
Rico. But the Cubans would have paid more for less, since colonial
priorities inevitably take precedence over allocative efficiency. The island
would have grown more slowly, since Cuban growth during the first sugar
boom was tied to staples, such as wheat flour from the United States. Trade,
as always, facilitated specialization. In such a world, Mexicans would have
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had more agricultural employment, and Cuban planters would have possessed fewer slaves. For once, it is hard to make an issue of efficiency. An
empire in which Cuban sugar planters played second fiddle to Mexican
labradores requires imagination enough.
However provocative this analysis may be, it can do no more than suggest
why there was no agricultural export interest in Mexico. It cannot explain
why farmers and landowners who faced deteriorating internal terms of
trade because of protection did not protest much. Colonial interest groups
were never reticent in their opposition to new taxes and other such
"novelties." Why should they have been so in this case?
There are a few possible explanations. David Brading noted the ostensible weakness of the landed classes in his analysis of Mexico's late colonial
elite: "Ownership of a great estate brought more prestige than legal status.
In general, the Mexican hacendado lacked the privileges, the fiscal exemptions and the command of political office that was associated with gentry
status in Europe." 47 Or consider Guy Thomson's characterization of
farmers in the Puebla district: "Landowners remained a shadowy and
unassertive political force in the thirty years following Independence, in
contrast to the more articulate merchants, artisans and manufacturers who
devised Puebla's protectionist political economy [and] organized the protectionist lobby." 48 The formation of commercial policy in early national
Mexico clearly supports these observations.
Mexico's class structure mattered as well. In the early nineteenth century, an agrarian "bourgeoisie" that lived exclusively on land rents existed
only in embryo. 49 To be sure, there were small farmers-the labradores of
Atlixco, for example-who specialized in growing cereals for the domestic
market. For most large landowners, however, land was just another
investment. Examples of merchant-landlords or industrialist-landlords
(owners of obrajes who were hacendados as well) abound. To judge their
attitudes toward commercial policy by separate economic criteria is akin
to asking which part of their portfolios did the thinking. Moreover,
historians know that the great estates changed hands frequently. An
entrenched landowning class could scarcely have maintained itself. This,
too, arrested the formation of a stable, coherent, and politically powerful
landed elite.
Moreover, Mexico's landowners were a disparate lot, with diffuse
interests and incentives. Maize farmers, sheep and cattle ranchers, and
tobacco planters were a heterogeneous group. They differed in commercial
orientation, capitalization, and sensitivity to novel patterns (and price
levels) in foreign trade. Even if their aggregate losses from commercial
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policies were large, the landowners could be mobilized only with great
difficulty. It took a major threat, such as the consolidaci6n de vales reales
in I 804, to weld together a powerful agrarian coalition. And then, survival
rather than mere discomfort was at issue. 5°

Desperate Diseases, Desperate Remedies
For various reasons, neither miners nor landowners formed parts of a
viable coalition of free traders. Yet protection was scarcely the product of
default. Even Mexican textile entrepreneurs experienced persistent instability in their ranks.51 N evertheless, the demands of these entrepreneurs
and their allies were coherent enough to shape a protectionist policy. Why?
In part, the channels of influence through which entrepreneurs and
merchant capitalists could operate were well defined, well known, and well
used. Industrialists could modify policy under the aegis of the Banco de
Avfo (1830-42) or, beginning in 1843, the Direcci6n de la Industria
N acional. In these years, textile manufacturers enjoyed considerable support. Perhaps the comment of the merchant Pedro Ansoategui says it best:
"There are at present [1841) many enterprises and projected factories for
making yarn in various parts of the republic and associated with these can
be found persons of consequence for their wealth and connections."5:z.
Wealth, connections, and access to power always help in making policy.
So, too, does the use of special pleading, and in the case of textile
manufacturers and workers, the pleading was special indeed.
The influence of urban artisans, laborers, and their employers is easy to
comprehend. As an organized-or even disorganized- political force,
these groups were powerful. During the late eighteenth century, Spanish
officials were obsessed with avoiding urban violence of any sort and took
steps to prevent it, including the requisition of vital food supplies. 53 This
concern translated into a distinctly ambivalent attitude toward industrialization. The creation of an urbanized factory labor force with its concentration of potentially seditious and unruly individuals was not especially
desirable. 54 Such fears were seemingly vindicated in l 8 i o by the bloody
Hidalgo rebellion, a movement allegedly nourished by the adherence of
textile workers from the city of Queretaro. 55 The disruptive potential of
the urban underclass was again emphasized in late 1828 by the sack of the
Paricin in Mexico City.56 As a result, the specter of unemployed artisans
and urban textile workers was worrisome to governments of all stripes. In
the principal cities of the country-Mexico City, Puebla, Queretaro,
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Oaxaca, Guadalajara, and Valladolid-textile workers were found in
significant numbers. To throw them out of work was to invite disaster in
an already tense political environment. Weak regimes bent on self-preservation could not afford to have large concentrations of urban artisans and
workers put out of work by foreign competition. Support for protection
thus was based on painful experience as well as on political expediency.
Desperate diseases call for desperate remedies.

Conclusions: Beyond the Bourbon Reconquest
Applying insights from the simple model of trade adjustment to the
history of early national Mexico suggests several conclusions. Perhaps most
important, divisions over commercial policy per se contributed little to
political instability in the first decades of Mexican independence. This is
not as counterintuitive as it might seem. There could be no real conflict
over a matter about which, in practical terms, there was no real disagreement. Of course, there was a theoretical and ideologically sophisticated
free-trade interest in Mexico. But it represented cosmopolitan and eclectic
thinkers familiar with Adam Smith and David Ricardo rather than any
concrete socioeconomic interest group. The debate spilled much ink, but
it could not have spilled much blood. We may eliminate commercial policy
as a source of political contention. Mexico's protectionist consensus was
based on utter realism. Protection was viewed as a matter of political or
material survival by many, and there was little organized opposition to it.
As things stood at the turn of the nineteenth century, Mexico could not
compete with the United States in the growing agricultural markets of the
Spanish Caribbean. Costs of transportation prevented it. Absent imperial
subsidies, there could be no Cuban or Puerto Rican market for Mexican
wheat flour. There were no Mexican estate owners bent on preserving free
trade, for few could have seen any prospect of substantial export.
Mutatis mutandis, there were no miners who said or cared much about
commercial liberalism. This had nothing to do with incentives or self-interest. The industry was badly damaged during the 1810s, and it took until
the 184os before the mines were again capable of generating the same kind
of growth that had occurred between 1760 and 1800. As a result, the
economic contraction that Mexico faced in the early nineteenth century
was a painful one. In the short run, at least, growth required the export of
silver, but that possibility was largely foreclosed. Labor from the declining
colonial textile industry could not find employment in any growing export
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sector. Plagued by persistent underemployment, agriculture could never
compete with silver as a source of exports. Lucas Alaman, a stateman of
considerable brilliance, knew what he was doing in advocating both the
rehabilitation of mining and the creation of a mechanized textile industry.
At the same time, allegiance to established ways of doing things on the
one hand and the changing international economic regime on the other
created powerful constituencies. The old colonial woolen industry and an
artisan cotton industry of more recent vintage depended on merchants for
finance and distribution. Such merchants could not look favorably on free
trade in English cottons, nor could the import-export merchants of Mexico
City, who had been raised on the rents of the fleet system. Aside from
Quiros and the Veracruz merchant guild, there were few who supported
free trade. If merchants did not preach the gospel of expanding demand,
then who would?
The real losers in the process of trade adjustment that began under the
Bourbons were naturally opposed to it. Owners of obrajes and their
spokesmen sensibly resisted freer trade in textiles. Artisans in the major
cities who had their accumulated capital at risk were similarly opposed.
Their stance is no mystery. And by the same token, the very strength of the
urban artisan class-its concentrated numbers-made insecure regimes
loath to provoke it. Experience and an obsessive concern with urban
violence made protection politically expedient, for tariffs protected the
income of people and resources wedded to the industry. The political
benefits of supporting this group were manifest, and the economic costs,
diffused. The political costs of opposing protection, on the other hand,
must have been all too obvious to precarious governments.
Our final point concerns the necessary restructuring of the Mexican
economy after 17 50. For a generation, historians have recognized the
agricultural adjustment required by Indian depopulation over the course
of the sixteenth century. Obscured, perhaps, by terms such as depression
and crisis, this change has been rebaptized as a "primitive emancipation"
by John Lynch and accorded a positive interpretation in terms of
investment in agriculture and industry, creole political hegemony, and
more. Yet the Bourbon Reforms themselves served to accelerate an equally
profound economic adjustment. They represented considerably more
than a bureaucratic "reconquest": they actually speeded the integration
of the Mexican economy into a growing international market for raw
materials and cheaper wage goods. Indeed, their lowering of transportation and transaction costs in international trade was tantamount to
reducing effective levels of protection. Of all the "novelties" of which the
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Bourbons were accused, this may well have been the most novel, and, to
date, the least appreciated. 57
In this sense, later protectionist policies of the early republican and
santanista regimes were counterrevolutionary. They sought to undo
what the Bourbon reforms had wrought. As the first president to don
the tricolor sash, Santa Anna undertook more than a Mexican emulation
of the July Monarchy in France. The champion of stringent tariff
protection and prohibitions was now the nation's advocate as well.
Nationalism and protection were thereby united in Mexican political
culture. In the final analysis, the victor at Tam pico was truly the scourge
of the Bourbons.
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